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The year 2004 witnessed a vast outpouring of scholarship celebrating and analyzing the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court=s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.1  The 
magnitude of this literature reflects the impact of Brown not only on the development of 
constitutional jurisprudence, but also on the overall pattern of race relations in America.  By 
holding that state-mandated segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court brought an end to the American system of official racial 
apartheid and set in motion a series of events that have dramatically altered the relationship 
between whites and African-Americans in our society more generally.  Thus, the scope of the 
reaction to the anniversary of the decision was entirely predictable and understandable.
 The attention lavished on Brown stands in marked contrast to the treatment of Tee-Hit-
Ton-Indians v. United States,2 which was handed down less than a year later.  The context in 
which Tee-Hit-Ton was decided was in many ways analogous to that of Brown itself.  Like 
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Brown, Tee-Hit-Ton profoundly effected the rights of a racial minority that had suffered greatly 
at the hands of the white majority B in this case, Native Americans.  Moreover, during the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the Court had shown no more sympathy for the 
plight of Native Americans than it had for African-Americans. However, the ultimate result in 
Tee-Hit-Ton could not have been more different than that in Brown.  Rather than breaking new 
ground in defense of Native American rights, the Court issued one of the most retrograde Indian 
law decisions of the twentieth century B a decision that commentators have argued is marked by 
Ablatant racism,@3 and analogous to the Court=s infamous 1857 decisions in Dred Scott v. 
Sanford.4
The ironies inherent in the juxtaposition of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton have been ignored in 
the widespread discussions and celebrations that have surrounded the fiftieth anniversary of 
Brown.5  Indeed, with the exception of a small band of Property teachers and Indian law experts, 
few scholars take any note of Tee-Hit-Ton at all; the case is typically ignored even in detailed 
studies of the structure and impact of Warren Court jurisprudence generally.6  This article, by 
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Not surprisingly, Tee-Hit-Ton has received much more attention from specialists in 
Indian law.  The most complete treatment of the background and impact of the case is Newton, 
supra n. 
contrast, will explore the lessons that can be learned from the Court=s disparate treatment of the 
two cases.  The article will begin by briefly recapitulating the events that ultimately led to the 
Brown decision.  Next, the article will outline the complex doctrinal background of Tee-Hit-Ton
and discuss the analysis of the Tee-Hit-Ton Court itself.  Finally, the article will describe the 
forces that led the Court to its very different conclusions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. 
I.  Brown v. Board of Education
The tale of Brown v. Board of Education is one of the best-known stories in legal history. 
 The story begins with the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Drafted by Northern Republicans in response to what they viewed as the 
unwillingness of Southerners to accept the full consequences of their defeat in the Civil War, the 
amendment was proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the requisite number of states in 
1868.7  The Equal Protection Clause itself was part of section one of the amendment, which in 
turn was intended to guarantee at least a measure of legal equality to African-Americans.  
Nonetheless, most commentators have concluded that the framers of the amendment did not have 
a specific intention to outlaw racial segregation in the public schools.8  Many, however, have also 
argued that the language of the clause by its terms suggests a more general commitment to a 
principle of equality that is broad enough to encompass a requirement that the state not segregate 
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its schools by race.9
Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the scope of the 
protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court=s first major pronouncement on 
the constitutionality of racial segregation came in its 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.10  In 
Plessy, with only a single dissent, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a 
Louisiana statute that required the operators of street railways to maintain separate but equal 
facilities for white passengers and their African-American counterparts.  Speaking for the 
majority, Justice Henry B. Brown first rejected a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to the statute, 
declaring that "[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the races...has no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary 
servitude."11  Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown began by sketching in general terms 
his vision of the reach of the amendment
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of 
the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been 
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, as distinguished from political 
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon grounds unsatisfactory to 
either.12
9 E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. 
L. J. 1 (1971).
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 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 Id. at 543.
12 Id. at 543-544.
The key question, of course, was how one was to define the phrase "equality...before the 
law."  In part, Brown's treatment of this issue reflected the evolution of the Republican position 
on race during the Reconstruction era.  At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, 
many Republicans drew a sharp distinction between civil rights and political rights, and the 
drafters made a conscious decision not to directly protect political rights.13  For Brown, by 
contrast, political equality was an essential element of equality before the law, and he cited the 
jury discrimination struck down in Strauder v. West Virginia14 as the classic example of a 
forbidden racial classification.  Outside the area of political rights, however, Brown was far more 
willing to countenance the use of race in government decisionmaking.  He cited a series of state 
court cases that had upheld school segregation as paradigms for the view that some racially-based 
laws did not violate Fourteenth Amendment principles.15
Having established the parameters of his analysis, Brown next turned to the case law that 
had dealt specifically with the issue of segregation by common carriers, concluding that the right 
of access to public conveyances did not merit special constitutional protection.  He then applied a 
rational basis test, noting that "every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend 
only to such laws as are enacted for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance 
or oppression of a particular class."16  Characterizing the Louisiana statute as an appropriate 
measure to ensure "good order" and the comfort of passengers of all races, Brown then proceeded 
13 Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, The Constitution and Congress (1990).
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to the most widely-quoted portion of his opinion
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in 
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it...Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions 
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.  If the civil and political 
rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or 
politically.  If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the 
United States cannot put them on the same plane.17
 Three years later, the Court addressed the specific issue of racial segregation in 
schools in Cumming v. County Board of Education.18  In Cumming, a group of African-
American parents launched a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the use of their tax 
dollars to support a high school for whites where no analogous institution was provided 
for the education of blacks.  Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, whose dissent in Plessy has become justly famous, rejected the black parents' 
contentions.  The specific basis for his ruling was that even if there were a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation in the allocation of funds, an injunction which undermined the 
17 Id. at 551-52.
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white school was not an appropriate remedy.19  At the same time, however the opinion 
seemed to implicitly approve the concept of segregated schools20 and closed with this 
language
while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by 
citizens without discrimination on account of their race, the education of the 
people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the 
respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the 
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and 
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.21
If any doubt remained about the constitutionality of the practice of maintaining segregated 
public schools, it was dispelled by the 1927 decision in Gong Lum v. Rice.22  In Gong Lum, the 
state of Mississippi required the daughter of a Chinese merchant to attend the public school for 
African-Americans, rather than the school for whites.  The Court unanimously rejected an equal 
protection challenge to this decision.  Citing Plessy, Cumming and a variety of state court cases, 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued that the case presented Athe same question which has 
been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state Legislature [sic] to 
settle@23 and that while A[m]ost of the cases cited arose...over the establishment of separate 
schools as between white pupils and black pupils; but we cannot think that the question is any 
19 Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544-45.
20 Id. at 545.
21 Id. at 545.
22
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different...where the issue is as between white pupils and pupils of the colored races.@24
By its terms, the prevailing doctrine of the Plessy/Gong Lum era required the states to 
provide equal facilities for whites and African-Americans.  Nonetheless, in practice, the school 
systems in states which mandated racial segregation were both separate and unequal.  Beginning 
in 1937 with Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,25 a series of Supreme Court decisions involving 
law schools clearly signaled that the Court was taking the requirement of equality very seriously 
indeed.26  However, by its nature, attacks based on the theory that the schools provided to 
African-Americans were inferior to those attended by whites required laborious, case-by-case 
challenges to the specific conditions that existed in each school system.  Thus, those seeking to 
improve educational opportunities for African-American children decided to mount an assault on 
the basic principles that the Court had enunciated in Plessy.  Brown and its companion cases 
were the vehicles for that assault.
Brown was first argued before the Court during its October, 1952 term.  In the conference 
that followed the argument, the justices split along geographic lines.27  Justices Felix Frankfurter 
of Massachusetts, William O. Douglas of Connecticut, Robert H. Jackson of New York, Harold 
H. Burton of Ohio, and Sherman Minton of IndianaBall of whom were appointed from states that 
24 Id. at 87.
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had been free states at the outbreak of the Civil WarBwere apparently in favor of overturning 
Plessy; among the free state justices, only Robert H. Jackson appeared to be undecided.28
Conversely, three of the four justices from former slave statesBChief Justice Frederick M. Vinson 
of Missouri and Justices Stanley F. Reed of Kentucky and Thomas C. Clark of TexasB initially 
argued that Plessy should remain good law.  Only Justice Hugo L. Black crossed the regional 
divide and joined the Northerners in advocating the abandonment of Plessy.
Even those justices who favored overruling Plessy recognized that such a decision would 
engender great political upheaval in the South, and that the scope of this upheaval would likely 
be magnified if the decision were not unanimous.  Hoping to find some way to compose their 
differences, they put Brown over for reargument, directing the attorneys on both sides to address 
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the interim, Chief Justice Vinson 
died, and was replaced by Earl Warren of California.   Warren personally favored overruling 
Plessy, and after the reargument he Clark was soon convinced to join the majority.  Reed was the 
final holdout; however, cognizant of the desirability of unanimity and faced with the reality that 
Plessy was going to be overruled in any event, he relented as well.  Thus, on May 17, 1954, 
Warren announced that the Court had concluded unanimously that the government could not 
require public schools to be segregated on the basis of race.
28
 Klarman, supra n. , at 295, suggests that Frankfurter was also undecided at this stage.  
However, the evidence of the Court=s internal proceedings is to the contrary.  Admittedly, 
Frankfurter had great difficulty in reconciling the ultimate result in Brown with conventional 
legal analysis.  However, his own conference notes describe the Court as divided five to four in 
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The price of unanimity was a nonaccusatory, bland opinion that focused narrowly on the 
impact of segregated schools on African-American children.  Warren began by describing the 
discussions surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as Ainconclusive@ on the 
question of whether the maintenance of segregated schools was originally understood to be 
rendered unconstitutional by the Equal Protection Clause.29  He also argued that, in any event, 
public schools had grown in importance in the intervening years, declaring that A[t]oday, 
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments@30 and that Ait is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he has been denied the 
opportunity of an education.@31  Citing modern psychological studies which suggested that 
African-Americans suffered psychological harm from being educated in a segregated 
environment,32 Warren concluded that Ain the field of public education, the doctrine of >separate 
but equal= has no place.  Separate education facilities are inherently unequal.@33
While the decision in Brown clearly outlawed racial segregation in schools operated by 
state governments and their subdivisions, it did not directly resolve the issue of segregation in the 
District of Columbia public schools.  These schools were operated by an institution of the federal
government, and by its terms the Equal Protection Clause applies only to the states.  However, 
from a political perspective, it would have been unthinkable to outlaw segregation in the states 
and leave the federal government free to classify students on the basis of race.  Thus, in Bolling 
29 Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
30 Id. at 493.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 494 and n. 11.
33 Id. at 495.
v. Sharpe,34 Warren concluded that the maintenance of segregated schools was also prohibited by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Given the reasoning of the Court in Brown, in theory the impact of the decision might 
have been limited to the specific context of school segregation.  However, the Court soon made it 
clear that it viewed Brown as establishing the principle that government-imposed racial 
segregation generally violated the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.35  Thus, although some have questioned its practical significance,36 Brown
clearly stands as an important milestone in the struggle for racial justice in America.  Tee-Hit-
Ton, by contrast, is a milestone of a quite different sort.
II.  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court was called upon to resolve the constitutional status of 
aboriginal title in landBtitle that Native Americans derived not from treaties, but rather from their 
status as preexisting occupants of the territory that became the United States. Even prior to the 
Tee-Hit-Ton decision, the Court had consistently held that Congress had broad authority to 
abrogate such claims, asserting that A[t]he power of Congress in that regard is supreme.  The 
manner, method and time of such extinguishment raise political, not justiciable, issues.@37
However, while the right of Congress to extinguish aboriginal title was well established, the 
question of whether Native Americans had a constitutional right to compensation for the 
34
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extinction of aboriginal title had not been clearly answered prior to 1955.  
The issue came to the Tee-Hit-Ton Court against the background of a long and complex 
series of doctrinal developments.   The Court first directly addressed the issue of Indian land 
rights in1810, in Fletcher v. Peck.38  In Fletcher, the state legislature of Georgia had conveyed to 
private parties a large tract of land that was occupied by Indians.  One of the grounds for 
challenging the sale was based on the theory that the Indian tribes possessed sufficient title to 
prevent the state of Georgia from holding a fee simple in the property.  Speaking for a majority of 
the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this argument, concluding that "the nature of 
Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it is legitimately extinguished, is 
not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state."39  Thus, although 
Marshall recognized the authority of the state government to convey title in land occupied by 
Native Americans, the language of the opinion strongly suggested that the grantee would take 
subject to the interest inherent in aboriginal title.
In any event, the treatment of the Indian land claims in Fletcher was only a prelude to the 
pivotal decision in Johnson v. M=Intosh.40 Johnson arose from a dispute over title to a number of 
parcels of land in southern Illinois and Indiana..  The claims of the plaintiffs derived from private 
purchases made directly by white land speculators from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in 
1773 and 1775, respectively; at the time of the transactions, such private purchases were 
38
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forbidden by the British Proclamation of 1763.  Subsequent to these purchases, after the victory 
of the colonists in the Revolutionary War, the Indian tribes ceded the same land to the United 
States government by treaty.  The government had in turn sold the land to the defendants in 
Johnson.  The question in the case was which claim had priority.
The theoretical difficulties in Johnson derived in large measure from the somewhat 
ambiguous position of the right to acquire and convey real property generally.  On one hand, the 
right to own real property was characterized by prominent authorities such as Sir William 
Blackstone and Emmerich de Vattel as a natural right.41  On the other, it was closely related to 
membership in a political community.  Thus, in theory, under English law, title to all real 
property was ultimately traced to the Crown, and in general, noncitizens could legitimately be 
denied the right to acquire such property.42.
The problem in Johnson was that the case involved the rights of two different entities 
claiming sovereign authority over the same parcels of land.  Of course, the rights of the United 
States were derived from their treaties with the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indian tribes.  However, 
if prior to the execution of the treaties the Indian tribes had possessed full sovereign authority 
over the land, then the prior conveyance to the land speculators would have priority over the sale 
from the United States.  Thus, Johnson necessarily raised the question of which sovereign had 
ultimate authority over the land that was in dispute. 
41
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The claim of the United States derived from the English assertion of dominion over the 
land in question.  As a theoretical matter, however, it was far from clear why this claim should 
supercede the rights of the Indian tribe as the original inhabitants of the land--a status which 
normally carried with it a right to assert sovereign authority.43  Some early authorities had 
suggested that, as infidels, Indians lacked the capacity to exercise legally cognizable sovereign 
rights over the land in which they lived.44   Vattel, a leading jurisprude of the late eighteenth 
century, took a somewhat different tack in his classic Law of Nations.  He combined the doctrine 
that nations could validly assert claims to land that they discovered with one of the most 
important themes in the rhetoric of white supremacy--the superiority of an lifestyle and economy 
based on agricultural life to one based upon hunting and fishing.  
It is asked whether a Nation may lawfully occupy any part of a vast territory in 
which are to be found only wandering tribes whose small numbers cannot 
populate the whole country.  [Because] of the obligation of cultivating the 
earth...these tribes cannot take to themselves more land than they have need of or 
can inhabit and cultivate.  Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions can not 
be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the Nations of Europe, 
which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no 
special need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may 
lawfully take possession of them and establish colonies in them.45
43
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Whatever the theoretical merits of these arguments, their impact was buttressed by 
important pragmatic considerations.  What was at stake in Johnson was no less than the ability of 
the United States government to control and regularize the disposition of the territory over which 
it claimed sovereignty.  A decision granting priority to the land speculators' deed would have 
created a regime under which the title to federal lands would have been effectively controlled not 
by the federal government, but rather by the numerous Indian tribes that had inhabited the land 
prior to the arrival of European explorers.
Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously against the land speculators.  Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall relied 
in part on the fact that the original purchase from the Indians had been invalid under the 
proclamation of 1763.46  In addition, however, he engaged in a wide-ranging analysis of the 
status of Indian titles in the United States.  Marshall began this analysis with a detailed account 
of the chain of events which underlay the British claim of title to the Indian lands.  He then 
addressed the relationship between this claim and natural law arguments that supported the rights 
of the Indians themselves (and thus the arguments of the speculators).  Marshall argued that the 
Supreme Court was in essence a conduit for the sovereign authority of the government of the  
United States, and as such was bound to vindicate the policies of that government, even in the 
face of contrary natural law principles
The United States ...have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by 
which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.  They hold, and assert in 
themselves, the title by which it was acquired.  They maintain...that discovery 
46 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 564.
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by 
purchase or conquest.                                                                  
We will not enter the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants and 
manufacturers have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the 
territory they possess, or to contract their limits...The British government...whose 
rights have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by 
Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies...It is not for the courts 
of this country to question the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is 
incompatible with it.47
One problem remained, however; under widely-accepted principles of international law, 
conquerors generally recognized the private property rights of conquered peoples, and 
incorporated them into its citizenry.48  Marshall was clearly cognizant of this problem49 and 
sought to deal with it by resorting to the image of the Indians as savages whose way of life was 
incompatible with European values
The tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.  
To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a 
wilderness: to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they 
were as brave and high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by 
47 Id. at 587-89.
48
 Vattel, supra n. , at 309-11
49 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589-90.
arms every attempt on their independence.50
The two strands of Marshall's analysis came together in his ultimate description of the status of 
Indian land titles
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country 
into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance and 
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of 
the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and 
cannot be questioned.  So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian 
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in 
peace in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the 
absolute right to others.  However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to 
the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the 
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, 
perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.51
Obviously, Johnson was something less than a major victory for the supporters of Indian 
land rights.  However, Chief Justice Marshall did not conclude that the legal rights of Native 
Americans had been totally extinguished by the doctrine of discovery.  Instead, he explicitly 
noted that until the discoverer exercised its right Aby purchase or by conquest,@ Indians remained 
Athe rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as just claim to remain in possession of 
it.@52  In 1832, Marshall elaborated on the legal significance of aboriginal title in Worcester v. 
50 Id. at 590.
51 Id at 591-92.
52 Id. at 588, 593.
Georgia.53
Worcester arose from an effort by the government of the state of Georgia to assert its 
authority over the Cherokee Indians who were residing on a reservation with the state=s borders.54
  In 1802, Georgia had ceded its claims to western lands in return for the promise of the United 
States to extinguish the Indian claims to land within its boundaries as soon as it could be done 
"peaceably" and on "reasonable terms."  The Cherokees, however, with the encouragement and 
aid of the federal government, had adopted farming in place of hunting, and had become attached 
to their lands.  They refused to move.  Moreover, in 1827 they adopted a constitution based on 
the United States model and declared themselves an independent nation.  In response, the 
Georgia state legislature adopted a series of laws that placed the Cherokee lands within several 
counties of the state and declared that after June 1, 1830, Georgia law would be enforced in the 
area and that all Indian customs and laws would be null and void.  In addition, Indians were 
denied the right to testify in cases involving whites, and whites were prohibited from 
discouraging them from emigrating westward.  
The Cherokees first sought to maintain an action in their own name challenging the 
constitutionality of the Georgia statutes. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,55 Marshall spoke for a 
majority of the justices in concluding that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction over the suit. 
However, the following term, in Worcester, the Court was faced with an appeal by a white 
53
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missionary who had been convicted for violating the Georgia law which prohibited white men 
from residing in Cherokee territory without a license from the state.  In this procedural posture, 
Worcester did not present the Article III problems that had characterized Cherokee Nation; 
moreover, as a clear invocation of personal right, the case could not be characterized as involving 
purely political questions.  Thus, a decision on the merits became inevitable.
Once again speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Georgia 
statute was unconstitutional.  Worcester is best known for holding that only Congress possessed 
authority to regulate Indian tribes.  In rejecting the state of Georgia=s argument, however, 
Marshall was forced to confront the claim that Georgia possessed sovereignty over the Indian 
lands because, under the doctrine of discovery, the Cherokees had no legally-cognizable property 
interest in the land that they occupied.  Rejecting this claim, Marshall emphasized the legal 
significance of the aboriginal title that he had been recognized in Johnson, asserting that the 
doctrine of discovery Aregulated the right...among the European discoverers, but could not affect 
the right of those already in possession...as aboriginal occupants...It gave the exclusive right to 
purchase [to the discoverer], but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor 
to sell.@56
 In 1835, the Marshall Court once again focused on the status of aboriginal title in Mitchel 
v. United States.57   In Mitchel, an English mercantile house had purchased large amounts of 
property from the Seminole Indian tribe in Florida.  The purchase was made with the permission 
56 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544
57
 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
The most comprehensive treatment of Mitchel is David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M=Intosh 
Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 171 (1994).
of the Spanish government, which was at that time generally recognized as the ruler of Florida.  
Subsequently, Florida was ceded to the United States in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819.  The 
United States claimed that the rights that it had acquired by the treaty superceded the claim of the 
successors to the purchaser from the Seminole tribe.  The Court unanimously held that the claim 
of the original purchasers had precedence.
The fact that the purchasers had acted with the blessing of the Spanish government 
loomed large in the Court=s disposition of Mitchel.  Nonetheless, the opinion of the Court is 
notable for its emphasis on the significance of aboriginal title.  Justice Henry Baldwin spoke for 
the Court in Mitchel.  Baldwin was something less than a consistent supporter of Native 
American rights; for example, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,58 he stood alone in arguing in
favor of the right of the state of Georgia to assert sovereignty over the Cherokee lands.   In 
Mitchel, however,  he asserted that, during the colonial period, Athe friendly Indians were 
protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and were considered as owning them by a 
perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them from generation to 
generation@59  and that Atheir hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the 
cleared fields of the whites.@60 Thus, Baldwin concluded, Atheir right of occupancy is considered 
as sacred as the fee simple of the whites,@61 and that A[t]he Indian right to the lands as property 
was not merely of possession, that of alienation was concomitant.@62
58 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at - , (Baldwin, J., concurring) 
59 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 745.
60 Id. at 746.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 758.
With their emphasis on the legal significance of aboriginal title, Worcester and Mitchel
provide at least inferential support for the view that the abrogation of aboriginal title gives rise to 
a Fifth Amendment claim for compensation.  By contrast, a series of decisions in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries might be seen as pointing in the opposite direction.  
These decisions did not deal directly with the status of aboriginal title.  However, they reflect a 
vision of congressional authority over Indian affairs that is virtually unfettered by extrinsic 
constitutional constraints.63
           The most infamous of these decisions is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.64  The complex fact 
situation of Lone Wolf 65 revolved around the Medicine Lodge Treaty 1867, which provided that 
the heads of families of the Kiowa and Commanche tribes could claim 320 acres from the 
common land of the reservation as separate property, and provided further that reservation land 
could not be ceded without the consent of three fourths of the male adult Indians occupying the 
land.  Later, the Apache tribe was brought under the same regime.  In 1892, 456 adult males 
signed a treaty ceding a ceding over two million acres of reservation land in exchange for a 
payment of two million dollars, to be held in trust; the Indian agent certified that at the time, the 
three tribes contained 562 male adults.  After Congress adopted implementing legislation, 
members of the relevant tribe sought to void the agreement.   They alleged that the count of 
eligible adult males was wrong, and that less than three quarters had in fact signed.  Moreover, 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (Congress has plenary power 
to regulate conduct on Indian reservations).
64
 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
65 Lone Wolf  is discussed in detail in Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The 
Long Shadow, in Sandra L. Cadwalder and Vine Deloria, eds., The Aggressions of Civilization: 
 Federal Indian Policy since the 1880s 215-45 (1984).
they contended that the signatures had been fraudulently obtained because the translator had 
misled them regarding the amount that they would receive.  Finally, they asserted that the 
implementing legislation unlawfully changed the agreement that was signed.  Under these 
circumstances, the Indians argued that implementation of the agreement would violate the Fifth 
Amendment by depriving them of a property interest which was established by treaty.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Indians' argument.  Speaking for the 
majority, Justice Edward White quoted at length from the Court=s earlier decision in United 
States v. Kagama66 and emphasized the plenary authority of Congress over Indian affairs--even in 
the face of contrary treaty language
When...treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians 
it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a 
contingency such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental 
policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians 
....
      Congress [has full administrative power] over Indian tribal property.  In effect, 
the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of such power, a 
mere change in the form in the investment of Indian tribal property, the property 
of those who...were in substantial effect the wards of the government.  We must 
presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings, with the Indians 
of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the government 
exercised its best judgment in the premises.  In any event, as Congress possessed 
66 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566-67, quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
(1886).
full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives 
which prompted the enactment of this legislation.67
67 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566, 568 (quotations and citations omitted).
While not directly addressing the issue of aboriginal title, the Lone Wolf Court=s emphasis 
on the prerogatives of Congress plainly did not bode well for judicial protection of Indian land 
claims generally.   Indeed, if anything, one might have thought that the Lone Wolf plaintiffs stood 
on stronger legal ground than subsequent parties who might seek to vindicate aboriginal title per 
se. In Lone Wolf, the Native Americans could point to an agreement to which the federal 
government had voluntarily acceded and which both parties must have believed to have been 
legally binding.  Nonetheless, the Court was willing in effect to allow Congress to modify the 
agreement without the consent of the Native American parties.  Intuitively, one might well have 
expected the Court to be even less hospitable to claims based solely on common law principles 
that established the rights of preexisting occupants.  
Subsequent caselaw, however, clearly revealed limits to Congressional power under the 
Lone Wolf regime.  In a series of decisions such as United States v. Creek Nation68 and Shoshone 
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 69 the Court repeatedly and consistently held that the outright 
transfer of tribal lands held under treaty required the government to pay compensation to the 
affected tribes.  These cases did not address the question of whether similar compensation was 
required when aboriginal title was at stake.  Nonetheless, decided as they were against the 
background of the plenary power analysis of Lone Wolf, they could plausibly be viewed as 
providing at least inferential support for a right to compensation in the absence of treaties.
For much of the twentieth century, jurisdictional barriers prevented the assertion of 
claims for Native American compensation based on claims that were not derived from treaty 
rights.  In general, prior to 1946, the federal courts were granted jurisdiction only to hear Indian 
land claims based on statute or treaty.  By definition, the narrowness of this jurisdictional grant 
excluded claims based on aboriginal title.  However, the general grant of jurisdictional authority 
was at times supplemented by statutes that expanded jurisdiction in specific, narrowly-defined 
circumstances. For example, in 1935, Congress adopted a statute granting the Court of Claims 
authority to hear cases involving Aany and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing 
out of the original Indian title claim or rights@ in lands described a number of unratified treaties 
dealing with land originally located in the Oregon Territory.70  This statute laid the groundwork 
for United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks71 [Tillamooks I], which ultimately found its way to 
68
 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
69
 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
70
 49 Stat. 801 (1935).
71
 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
the Supreme Court in 1946.
The story of Tillamooks I began in 1850, when Congress authorized the negotiation of 
treaties with Indian tribes in the Oregon Territory.  Acting under the authority provided by this 
statute, in 1855, the representatives of the United States and the Alcea Tillamooks concluded a 
agreement whereby the tribes agreed to cede much of their land in return for a cash payment and 
the creation of a reservation.  The treaty was to become operative only upon ratification.  
Anticipating ratification, on November 9, 1855, President Franklin Pierce issued an Executive 
Order creating a reservation for the Tillamooks whose dimensions were substantially the same as 
those described in the treaty, and the Tillamooks were almost immediately confined to the 
reservation.  The size of the reservation was reduced by a new Executive Order in 1865.  An 
1875 statute further reduced the reservation.  Finally, in 1894, Congress passed a statute officially 
accepting and approving the reservation with the new dimensions.  However, the original treaty 
was never ratified, and the Tillamooks did not receive the cash payment promised in the 
agreement.
In their suit in the Court of Claims, the Tillamooks sought compensation for being 
deprived of their land.  In addition to arguing that extinguishment of aboriginal title by its terms 
constituted a cognizable taking under the Fifth Amendment, they relied on two statutory 
arguments.  First, they asserted that the 1935 statute creating jurisdiction in the Court of Claims 
implicitly recognized aboriginal title as a compensable property interest.  Second, they noted that 
the 1848 statute establishing a government for the Oregon Territory provided that Anothing in this 
act shall be construed to impair the rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in 
[the Oregon] Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the 
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United States and said Indians.@72
After the Court of Claims ruled in favor of the Tillamooks, the government appealed to 
the Supreme Court.  With Justice Robert H. Jackson absent due to his participation in the 
Nuremberg trials, the case was initially argued in early 1946 before a Court of eight justices.  At 
the initial conference, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justices Stanley F. Reed, Wiley B. 
Rutledge and Harold H. Burton voted to reverse the Court of Claims and reject the claim for 
compensation, while Justices Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and Frank Murphy 
supported the Tillamooks and Justice Hugo Lafayette Black expressed some uncertainty about 
the proper resolution of the case.  However, Stone died suddenly before the case was finally 
resolved, and the case was put over for reargument.  At the conference after the reargument, 
Frederick M. Vinson, Stone=s replacement, announced his support for the position of the 
Tillamooks.  Black also took this view, creating a clear majority in favor of compensation.73
Vinson=s plurality opinion is replete with language that might be seen as supporting the 
view that the extinguishment of aboriginal title carries with it an automatic right to 
compensation. He began by asserting that A[a]dmitting the undoubted power of Congress to 
extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that compensation need not be paid@74 that 
A[t]he Indians have more than a mere moral claim for compensation,@75 and that denying the 
72
 9 Stat. 323 (1845).
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  This account is taken from the conference notes of Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Box 
152, Wiley B. Rutledge Papers, Library of Congress.
74 Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 47 (opinion of Vincent, C. J.)
75 Id.
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claim of the Tillamooks would Aignore the plain import of traditional methods of extinguishing 
Indian title.@76  In addition, he explicitly rejected a rule that would allow recovery only in cases 
where Congress had formally recognized the validity of the aboriginal title.77
However, Chief Justice Vinson stopped short of endorsing the principle that all aboriginal 
title was protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While concluding that the 
jurisdictional statute did not convey any substantive rights, he inferred a right to recovery from 
the protections that had been provided by the 1848 statute.78  Concurring, Justice BlackBwhose 
vote was critical to the establishment of any binding rule in Tillamooks IBwas even more explicit. 
 While arguing that right to compensation could be derived from the jurisdictional statute, Black 
also asserted that A[b]efore Congress passed the special Act under which this suit was brought, I 
think that the Government was under no more legal or ethical obligation to pay these respondents 
than it was under obligation to pay whatever descendants are left of the numerous other tribes 
whose lands and homes have been taken from them since the Nation was founded.@79
The Court clarified the import of its decision in Tillamooks I when United States v. 
Tillamooks80 [Tillamooks II] returned to the Court five years later. On remand from Tillamooks I, 
the Court of Claims had awarded of $3,000,000 plus interest from the date of the taking.  The 
government appealed from the award of interest, noting that interest was only appropriate if the 
76 Id.
77 Id. at 48-50.
78 Id. at 49.
79 Id. at 54 (Black, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
80
 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (per curiam).
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damage award was founded on the Fifth Amendment and contending that the original decision 
had been based instead on statutory authority.  In a brief, per curiam opinion the Court accepted 
the government=s argument, observing that A[l]ooking to the former opinions in this case, we find 
that none of them expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.@81 Thus, when Tee-Hit-Ton came before the Court in 1955, the constitutional status 
of aboriginal title remained uncertain.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, a clan of Tinglit Indians sought compensation after the Secretary of 
Agriculture authorized the sale of timber from the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.  The Court 
of Claims found that, at the time that the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, the 
Tee-Hit-Tons possessed aboriginal title to the land on which the timber was located.  The Tee-
Hit-Tons argued that their title had been recognized by an 1884 statute organizing the Alaska 
Territory,82 but that if their title had not been officially recognized, they were entitled to 
compensation because the sale of the timber effected a partial taking of their preexisting property 
rights.  The procedural barriers to the suit had been removed by the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946.83  Nonetheless, a six-justice majority 
not only held that the 1884 statute had not recognized any rights in the Tee-Hit-Ton, but also 
rejected the Tee-Hit-Ton=s claim based on aboriginal title.
81 Id. at 49.
This conclusion had been foreshadowed by Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 
106 n. 28 (1949).
82
 Organic Act for the State of Alaska, 24 Stat. 24 (1883).
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 28 U.S.C. sec. 1505.
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Justice Stanley Reed, who had dissented in Tillamooks I,84 spoke for the Court in Tee-Hit-
Ton.   Reed asserted that aboriginal title Ais not a property right but amounts to a right of 
occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which 
right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself 
without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.@85  After reviewing the 
caselaw, he stated flatly that AIndian occupation of land without government recognition of 
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by the United States protected by the 
Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.@86  Reed was apparently deaf to the eerie 
similarities between this conclusion and Roger Brooke Taney=s infamous claim that, at the time 
the Constitution was drafted, free African-Americans Ahad no rights that the white man was 
bound to respect.@87
 Against this background, the contrast between Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton could not be more 
stark.  In Brown, the Court rejected deeply-ingrained legal traditions that had contributed to the 
subjugation of African-Americans; in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court reinforced the elements of the legal 
regime that contributed to the decimation of Native American culture.  Brown paved the way for 
an improvement in the opportunities available to African-American; Tee-Hit-Ton denied 
recompense to Native Americans for economic injuries.  The question thus becomes why the 
Court vindicated the interests of African-Americans while treating the claims of Native 
84 Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 59-64 (Reed, J., dissenting).
85 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 271.
86 Id. at 272.
87
 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, (1857).
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Americans so cavalierly.
III.  Understanding the Dynamic of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton
The respective decisions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton reflect the influence to two different 
types of forces.  The first is that of distinctively legal principlesBformal legal analysis.  The 
second is that of the more general political environment.  Each of these forces played a 
significant role in generating the disparate results in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.
Formal differences between the two cases were a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the Court=s disparate conclusions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.  The two cases involved quite 
different claims of right, derived from quite different sources.  Brown was an Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim that was based solely the positive authority of the 
Constitution itself.  In Tee-Hit-Ton, by contrast, the source of the constitutional claim was the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Moreover, although all Native Americans had been 
made citizens of the United States by statute in 1925, the argument of the plaintiffs was 
ultimately based on a property interest that was not created by the Constitution, but instead 
allegedly existed even before the first Europeans settled what was to become the United States.
However, only the most naive observer would suggest that the Court was moved entirely 
or even primarily by formal considerations in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.  Indeed, if one were to 
focus only on formal concerns, he could argue persuasively that the Native Americans in Tee-
Hit-Ton had a much stronger constitutional claim than the children in Brown. Despite their 
ultimate support for the result, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson apparently believed 
that Brown could not plausibly be viewed as reflecting any Aneutral@ principle of constitutional 
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law.88 Obviously, the decision was inconsistent with existing precedent.  In addition, it was based 
on a view of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that was questionable at 
best.  By contrast, the commentators who have addressed the issue have often concluded that 
Johnson, Worcester and Michel strongly suggested that the Native Americans claimants were 
entitled to compensation in Tee-Hit-Ton.89
The difference between the treatment of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton is more plausibly 
explained by reference to the political dynamic of the mid-1950s.   Beginning with the 
presidential election of 1936, the African-American vote had been an important element of the 
coalition that brought victories to Democrats Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, 
who in turn appointed almost all of the justices who decided both cases.  Moreover, by 1954, the 
issue of racial segregation had become an important issue in national politics.  Indeed, Truman=s 
decision to desegregate the military in 1946 had split the Democratic party along regional lines, 
leading to the formation of a short-lived  ADixiecrat@ party that nominated Strom Thurmond for 
president in 1948 on an avowedly segregationist platform.  With Thurmond depriving him of the 
electoral votes of five normally-Democratic Southern states, Truman only defeated Thomas 
Dewey because of overwhelming support from African-Americans in the North.  Although the 
Democratic party reunited in 1952, the issue of segregation and civil rights generally remained a 
high-profile issue, with African-Americans having the support of a number of important political 
88
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89 E.g., Newton, supra n. , at 1217; Singer, supra n. , at 519-27. 
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constituencies in the North.90
The situation of Native Americans was quite different.  With a population of only 
357,000 in 1950, Native Americans had no substantial impact on the political process, and few
influential allies in the white community.  The disparity in political influence is illustrated 
dramatically by the briefs filed in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.  The position of the African-American 
plaintiffs was supported not only by the United States government, but also by amicus briefs filed 
by groups as disparate as the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
American Federation of Teachers, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the American 
Veterans Committee.91  By contrast, the only amicus briefs filed in Tee-Hit-Ton came from state 
attorneys-general who were opposed the Native American claimants.92
The widespread support enjoyed by the plaintiffs in Brown and its progeny also reflected 
a more basic aspect of the American political self-image.  From much of the nation=s history, the 
treatment of African-Americans in the South had been condemned by important figures in the 
North as a regional aberration that was inconsistent with the basic values embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.93   Segregation in particular was seen as an 
affront to the basic principles of equality embodied in the Reconstruction amendments (whatever 
the original understanding of those amendments might have been.), as well as an embarrassment 
90
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91 Brown, 347 U.S. at 485-86.
92 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273.
93 For early examples, see, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1872) 
(remarks of Sen. Sumner); Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 1179-84 (1819) (remarks of 
Rep. Fuller).
33
to a nation that was attempting to present itself to the Cold War world as the paragon of freedom, 
justice, opportunity and equality.94  From this perspective, the decision in Brown did nothing 
more than remove an anomaly that was a stain on the national character.
Conversely, a victory for the plaintiffs in Tee-Hit-Ton would have been inconsistent with 
the image of America as a nation with a deep historical commitment to justice.  The treatment of 
the Tee-Hit-Tons by the federal government could not be dismissed as a isolated phenomenon.  
Instead, in substantial measure, the nation owed its very existence to analogous actions.  Thus, in 
Tee-Hit-Ton, in his majority opinion, Justice Reed observed that A[e]very American schoolboy 
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force, 
and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and 
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conqueror=s will that deprived them of their land.@95  While 
some scholars have disputed this characterization of the process by which the United States 
acquired tribal lands,96 the belief that the government had acquired vast amounts of Indian 
territory by force or fraud provides the backdrop for the Court=s decision in Tee-Hit-Ton. 
Given these assumptions, the actions of the United States government and its citizenry 
were justified by the widespread view that they were bringing civilization to a land that, despite 
94
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the presence of Native Americans, was in a very real sense unclaimed.  In 1945, Justice Jackson 
captured the essence of this view in his concurring opinion in Northwestern Band of Shoshone 
Indians v. United States97
The Indian parties to this treaty were a band of simple, relatively peaceful, and 
extremely primitive men...The Indian parties did not know what titles were, had 
no such concept as that of individual title, and had no sense of property in 
land...Ownership meant no more to them than to roam the land as a great 
common, and to possess and enjoy it in the same way that they possessed and
enjoyed sunlight and the west wind and the feel of spring in the air.98
Under this view, the white settlers and their government could plausibly claim that they had not 
done anything fundamentally wrong in asserting ownership over territory that Native Americans 
had previously seen as their homeland.  Of course, the government was still bound honor its 
agreements, and might also be viewed as having some moral obligation toward Native 
Americans.  However, the government could still argue that it had not deprived Native 
Americans of any right that was seen as truly fundamental in the Anglo-American tradition.
This position, however, could not survive a holding that the abrogation of aboriginal title 
per se gave rise to a claim of constitutional magnitude.  Such a holding would have decisively 
labeled the displacement of Native American claims as a massive, unjust expropriation of 
propertyBa particularly striking example of what today we would describe as ethnic cleansing.  
This conclusion fits at best uneasily with the concept of a nation that purports to be founded upon 
97
 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
98 Id. at 356-57 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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principles of law and justice.
Viewed against this background, Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton can be seen as complimentary 
rather than conflicting.  On one hand, the Brown Court sought to eliminate practices that the 
dominant political faction viewed as aberrational and inconsistent with basic American principles 
of equality and justice.  On the other, Tee-Hit-Ton minimized the import of the injustices 
inherent in the process by which the nation was established.  Thus, in both cases, the decisions of 
the Court worked to bolster and reinforce the image that Americans had of themselves and 
sought to project to the world at large in the mid-1950s. 
Conclusion
Any number of important lessons can be drawn from Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.  First, 
taken together, the cases illustrate the complexity of racial issues in America.  Both cases 
involved the claims of racial minority groups.  Both groups had suffered grievously at the hands 
of the dominant whites.  However, the two groups had quite different relationships with the white 
power structure, and the ultimate decisions in the two cases reflected the influence of these 
differences.
 More generally, taken together, the two decisions reveal the flaws in the most common
justification for judicial activism that does not reflect the original understanding of the 
Constitution.  Many commentators have justified such activism on the ground that judges are 
institutionally well-positioned to make dispassionate assessments of the merits of fundamental 
moral arguments.  Thus, for example, Owen Fiss argues that judges search for what is Atrue, right 
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and just,@99 and Ronald Dworkin contends that nonoriginalist judicial review  Ainsures that the 
most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of 
principle and not simply as issues of political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any 
case not fully, within the legislature.@100  The decision in Brown is often seen as one of the 
quintessential example of  the operation of this process.
When juxtaposed with Tee-Hit-Ton, however, Brown emerges in a quite different light.  
Without question, racial segregation was and is fundamentally wrong, and the elimination of 
segregated schools was a vindication of an important moral principle.  However, the moral claim 
of the Brown plaintiffs was certainly no stronger than that of the Native Americans whose land 
was expropriated without even the shadow of consent.  Against this background, the result in
Brown cannot be seen as reflecting special judicial competence in dealing with basic moral 
questions.  Rather, it must be seen as the result of a historical fortuity that created a Court that 
was dominated by adherents to Northern, liberal ideology on racial issues.  We can and should 
celebrate the result of this fortuity; however, we should not overstate its significance for the 
justification of judicial review more generally.
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